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This contribution provides a summary review of the development of battle maps in Scotland over a two hundred year period, between the Battle of Pinkie in 1547 and the Battle of Culloden in 1746. These specialised types of maps, it is proposed, are an extremely valuable resource in the relatively new field of battlefield archaeology. They provide an important insight into the nature of the terrain at the time of the battle, which may have changed considerably since the time of the conflict in question. They also depict troop locations and give an insight into battle choreography which is in some cases are more informative than the often confused or very sketchy eye witness accounts. However, like the written accounts battle maps can be subject to inaccuracies and distortions, either accidental or deliberate and as discussed in the essay, some of these have recently been brought to light by archaeological survey. The role of maps in archaeological research is considered in relation to investigations carried out by the author at Culloden, a battle which was portrayed in a number of maps drawn up at the time or soon after.  





This essay considers the use of contemporary battle maps in the archaeological investigation of historic battlefields in Scotland, with particular reference to the author’s own work at Culloden. These specialised types of maps, many of which are presumed to have been drawn by witnesses to the events they depict, are an extremely valuable resource in the relatively new field of battlefield archaeology (numerous battle maps have been produced by military historians over the generations following these battles but these are not the subject of this discussion). These documents provide an important insight into the nature of the terrain at the time of the battle, which may have changed considerably since the time of the conflict in question. They also provide indications of troop locations and battle choreography and in some cases are more informative than the often confused or very sketchy eye witness accounts. However, like the written accounts battle maps can be subject to inaccuracies and distortions, either accidental or deliberate, and as discussed below some of these have recently been brought to light by archaeological survey. 
Early beginnings – Pinkie and Dunbar
It was the Duke of Wellington who famously said: 'The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball' (Keegan 1983). What he went on to explain was that it was almost impossible to provide a coherent and accurate account of a battle from a single viewpoint. The mayhem of battle has not however dissuaded military historians from writing about these bloody events nor cartographers from drawing maps of them.  Battle maps have a long history, with the first example in Scotland, and one of the earliest battle maps from the British Isles, being the near contemporary map of the Battle of Pinkie fought between the English and the Scots in East Lothian in 1547. Written accounts of course have a somewhat longer pedigree, with the literature of the ancient world well populated with written descriptions of battles great and small. 
Pinkie was probably the largest battle to have been fought on Scottish soil and the last major engagement between Scotland and England as warring independent nations.  The battle was a resounding victory for the English, who with an army some 17,000 strong, under the Duke of Somerset, put to flight a Scottish force of as many as 30,000 men, under the Earl of Arran (these figures should be treated with caution as with many battles there is a tendency to overstate the number of combatants).  
The battle was fought to the southeast of Inveresk, on the slopes of Falside Hill and the coastal plain at its foot.  The most important of the contemporary maps takes the form of five drawings joined together on rolled paper, and rediscovered in the early 1930s by the military historian Sir Charles Oman in the Bodleian Library (Oman 1934).  In truth they are not really maps but projections or perspective plans which show the sweep of the landscape and the major settlements, including Edinburgh, which appears to the right of the frame.  The viewpoint is from a god-like position high above the Firth, and god himself is shown at the top left appearing from a cloud, from where he launches thunderbolts at the unfortunate Scots (a portrayal which could suggest an English or a protestant Scottish artist – the Scottish reformation was to herald a new period of internecine war in Scotland). 
The troops are shown as individual stick figures or more schematically arranged in vast pike blocks, many of the former being Scots fleeing the field toward Edinburgh.  The English are arrayed in four large blocks on the upper part of a hill while the Scots are in the foreground, on the plain in one vast block which is hemorrhaging deserters from its front left flank.  As Caldwell has pointed out (1991, 64) the Scottish army appears to have been squeezed into a single block, when in reality it was arrayed in three main blocks (battles).  This may reflect the limited view of the proceedings afforded the artist at the battle’s height and if so represents an example of the difficulties in providing an accurate description of a battle, or mapping mayhem, as expressed by Wellington.
There are two further perspective plans of Pinkie, one in the National Army Museum and one in the British Library, the former of which (Fig. 1) combines the main elements from the ‘comic strip’ form of the Bodleian plan but has been suggested to date to the 19th century (Caldwell pers. comm.).  Caldwell has further pointed out that some inaccuracies such as the twin barrels of the cannons are indicative of a copyist’s misinterpretation of the original (1991, 64).  The British Library copy may be similar, it has not been seen by the present author, but the catalogue describes it as being published between 1547 and 1548 and the ‘earliest surviving separately published map produced in Great Britain’.
If Pinkie did not already seem well served by plans, especially so when one considers the early date, this point is even more striking with the presence of a further series of what we would today better recognise as maps (more apparent with some of the series than others), being more like two dimensional, birds-eye views of the landscape, although buildings, ships and cannons are still represented by three dimensional images.  These maps (an example is shown as Fig. 2) accompany William Patten’s written account of the battle which was first published in 1548, the year after the battle (Dalyell 1798).  Each of them illustrates a different phase of the battle as it progressed, with symbols (circles and dots) representing horse and foot. Alphabetical annotation is also used with explanation provided in a key.   
Over recent years the Pinkie maps have become the focus for renewed interest as attempts have been made to precisely relocate the battlefield at Pinkie (e.g. Cooper 2008).  The issue of battlefield preservation is now an important aspect of heritage resource management in Scotland, and this has recently been reflected by the proposal by Historic Scotland to produce an Inventory of important Scottish battlefields (Foard and Partida 2005).  This initiative lags somewhat behind English Heritage’s Battlefield Register, which was implemented in 1994 and included 42 of what were deemed to be the most important battlefields on English soil. The aim of the Register and the forthcoming Inventory, which is currently undergoing a phase of public consultation, will be to highlight the importance of designated sites to planners and developers – one drawback being the lack of statutory protection.  
It is currently, and is likely to remain, the responsibility of archaeological officers in planning departments to make recommendations regarding development proposals which may impinge on battlefield sites.  It is in this context which some of the recent interest in Pinkie has arisen, the other impetus being the need to define the site for its entry in the proposed Battlefield Inventory.  The battle was important for several reasons, not only was it the biggest and the last (between Scotland and England) it also represents an important transition point in the history of military technology, marking the last gasp of the longbow and the first widespread use of firearms.  
Although the maps provide some important clues as to the location of the site, showing its position in relation to the town of Inveresk, the River Esk, and Falside Hill, there is still some disagreement among historians and battlefield archaeologists as to the precise location – if we can talk of such a widespread event in such terms.  Caldwell has the battlefield sandwiched between an area of marsh and a lane (the lane is shown as a north to south running feature on the Patten maps, with ploughed fields to the east of it). Using the same landscape features but with some variation as to the hills represented (for instance, the ridge in front of Falside Hill rather than the hill itself for the main English deployment) the re-assessment made by Glenn Foard of the Battlefields Trust on behalf of Historic Scotland places the battlefield further to the eEast, where Falside Tower rather than Carberry Tower is the closer of the two.  As Foard (and Partida 2005) points out it is Falside tower which appears to the rear of the English position on the perspective drawings rather than Carberry Tower.  Both locations have their drawbacks and advantages as far as combining written and drawn evidence is concerned but on the basis of current information the case remains unproven.  Several archaeological surveys have recently been carried out in the area, commissioned by prospective developers which include the local council, and it is hoped that these may shed more light on the issue.        
Battles are usually fluid, fast moving events and unlike the landscape within which they take place do not lend themselves to the ‘freeze frame’ of the cartographer’s pen. There is a tendency in many battle maps to reduce armies to neat, coloured blocks which remain either static or move across the landscape in a series of chess-like moves (there are for instance numerous maps of the battle of Waterloo which match this description).  Such renditions do little to capture the reality of battle, which tends to be a much more disorganized and messy business.  The artist responsible for the early Pinkie map is to be credited with trying to create images which do more to give an impression of this fluidity and chaos, though as already noted the drawings do have serious limitations as far as the accuracy of the disposition of troops is concerned. 
Sieges are of course more static affairs than battles and the 16th century was to see an important series of these in Scotland, including Leith in 1560, Haddington in 1548-1549 and Edinburgh Castle in 1573.  Perspective plans or prospects, similar in style to those from Dunbar and Pinkie, have survived for Leith and Edinburgh Castle and that for Leith, known as the Petworth map, has proved a vital source of information in the identification of archaeological features relating to the siege (Pollard 2009).
As far as locating a battle within the landscape is concerned a clearer case can perhaps be made for the battle of Dunbar fought between English Parliamentarian and Scottish Royalist forces, the former under Oliver Cromwell and the latter under David Leslie, on 3 September 1650.  Despite taking place over a century after Pinkie the graphic techniques used to document the battle have not changed much since 1547.  It is the perspective plan which has been adopted rather than the more modern looking map.  The view of the battle is once again taken from a high vantage point above the sea (from the east) and shows the Royalist army arrayed on the long ridge of hills to the west  with the parliamentarian army facing them on the lower ground in the middle distance.  
The battle was a decisive victory for Cromwell’s army, indeed it is counted as one of his finest military achievements. Although occupying higher ground the larger Scottish force could not deploy effectively across its entire front as its left flank was hemmed in against the Brox Burn. Cromwell focused his attacks on the right and with his cavalry taking the top of the hills behind the enemy total collapse and a rout resulted.  
The perspective plan shows the deployment of the various pike blocks and cavalry units on both sides, with Cromwell’s cavalry breaking through a gap in the Scottish right (on the left hand side of the drawing).  Important landscape features such as the Brox Burn, to the south of which sits the English camp, and the settlement marking the Scottish right, are given due prominence.  Today it is a relatively straightforward exercise to match the modern landscape to that shown on the map and indeed to understand how Cromwell achieved his victory.  Unfortunately, a large swathe of the lower ground on the Parliamentarian left has been quarried away but the main location of the fighting, higher up the hill, appears to be well preserved with a modern farm occupying the same location as the settlement shown on a ridge below the skyline and marked as ‘Great Pinkerton’.  
Despite the usefulness of the Dunbar plan in identifying the battlefield in the modern landscape there are problems with this type of perspective drawing.  The drawing was not composed as a single entity by an eye witness but created through the combination of a perspective landscape drawing and a separate plan showing the various dispositions of the opposing armies.  A similar technique was applied in the creation of the 1647 published perspective of the 1645 Battle of Naseby by Streeter (Foard 1995: 18), perhaps using Sippon’s ‘form of battle’ from 11 June 1645 as the basis for the deployment (a bird’s eye deployment map was also prepared by De Gomme).  More than one deployment plan may have been used as the source for the battle itself as various stages of the battle are combined to give an overall impression of the combat. 
From plans to maps – the Battle of Glenshiel, 1719

Although the battle map, as opposed to the perspective plan, clearly dates back as far as Patten’s depictions of the Battle of Pinkie, and continues with Fisher’s perspective drawing of the Battle of Dunbar fought in 1650 (not discussed here), the full adoption of the map has still not taken place by the time of the Battle of Glenshiel in 1719 (10 June).  Three maps were drawn up after the battle by John Henry Bastide, though two of these display only very slight variations between one another.  Bastide, who was to go on to perform as chief engineer in Amherst’s staff during his Louisburg expedition in Canada in 1758, served at the Battle of Glenshiel on the government side as a lieutenant in Colonel Montagu’s regiment. 
At first sight these maps may appear as no different to the earlier perspective drawings or plans, with the landscape shown in a three dimensional, oblique perspective/projection.  One of them (Fig. 3), which exists with two slight variations, depicts the battle as viewed from the south (across the glen) and the other (Fig. 4) from the east (along the glen). However, the perspective used in the two closely matched maps is far closer to the vertical than either the Pinkie or Dunbar plans, and is much more in keeping with the vertical projections used on modern maps; the glen, the river running through it, the steep slopes on its southern side and the lower slopes on the north side are all shown in true map form, whereas the mountainous peaks on the north side of the glen are shown in three dimensions.  Stick figures are also used in both maps to display the retreat of the Jacobites in the face of government attacks, but their initial positions and those of the government army, as well as the movements of the latter, are shown as the one dimensional blocks which were come to characterise battle maps for the next two centuries.    
On one of the almost closely matching maps the only exception to the use of unit blocks on the government side is the miniature portrait of the commander, Major General Whigtman, who sits astride his white horse. A very slight shift in his position is one of the main differences between these two maps.  In one (Fig. 5) he is located to the rear of the mortar unit which advanced along the valley floor to bombard Jacobite and Spanish positions to the west, while in the other he is shown standing alongside the mortar battery (Fig. 6).  It is tempting to suggest that this latter version was prepared in part to show the victorious commander in the best possible light, i.e. leading from the front (see below).
On the whole, Bastide’s maps are highly accurate, the topographic detail matching very well with the actual terrain.  The most obvious feature is the knoll at the western end of the map, on which the Spanish troops, fighting for the Jacobites, positioned themselves behind stone barricades.  These barricades can still be seen on the ground today and represent a very rare example of surviving field fortifications from any period.  It is the presence of these upstanding features which has led the knoll to be designated a Scheduled Ancient Monument, a level of protection denied the vast majority of battle sites. Also readily located is the smaller rocky knoll on the south side of the glen, where the Jacobite right wing under a young George Murray was positioned, and from which refugee Jacobites are seen streaming away on the map.  On the north side of the glen the ranging crags across which the long left wing of the Jacobite force was positioned can today be seen just above the tree line of the commercial forestry planted on the steep hill slopes – more recently the southern side of the glen has also been planted, with no account being taken of its potential impact on that part of the battlefield.        
The second of Bastide’s maps of the battle borrows more from the old school of the three dimensional plan.  The view is from the east looking along the glen, which is shown in a distinctly more three dimensional fashion than in the other two maps.  Once again however the initial positions of the troops are marked as regular blocks, and the fleeing Jacobites drawn as individual stick figures. 
It may be no coincidence that the perspective view presented in the second Bastide map is the same as that of a near contemporary painting of the battle.  The work is by the Flemish artist, Peter Tillemans.  It would be reasonable to suggest that he used Bastide’s second map as the main source for the painting as he has portrayed the knoll on which the Spanish troops were positioned in exactly the same way – in reality it is not an isolated feature as it appears in both of these representations but as a spur or terrace running off the slope of the larger hill (this is still known today as 'Coirean nan Spainteach' or ‘Hill of the Spanish’).  The location of the troops is also closely matched. Tillemans does not however appear to have had sight of the other Bastide map as he portrays Wightman on a black horse rather than white, and also has him at the rear of the battle rather than the front, though this obviously places him at the forefront of the painting.!
The Purpose of Battle Maps
The original purpose of these battle maps is an interesting issue.  Plans and maps were obviously a very effective way of describing a battle to non-participants, giving some idea of the terrain in which it was fought and the movements of the armies within it.  Those which have survived tend be from the winning side, though as will be discussed later there are exceptions to this.  The map is therefore one way in which a victory can be remembered and even celebrated, with these documents presented to monarchs or the commanders of armies almost as souvenirs of the event.  They may also accompany official accounts of the battle submitted by commanders in the field to their superior officers or the monarch – as occurred with the Duke of Cumberland with his official written account and Sandby’s map of the battle (see below), both of which would have been submitted to his father George II.  One of the original versions of Bastide’s map found its way into the archives of the Captain General of His Majesty’s forces at the time, the Duke of Marlborough (Millar 1882) – perhaps it is no coincidence that the version to do so was the one which depicts Major General Wightman in the more advanced position.  Other clients for maps may have included foreign powers with interests in the outcome of overseas conflicts, so much so that in some cases they may have had ambassadors present at the battle – there is a Spanish account of Pinkie and a French ambassador witnessed the ’45 Rising from a Jacobite perspective (there is at least one French map of the battle of Culloden). 
By the time of Pinkie, or at least not long after, battle maps had begun to appear in history books, with the widespread introduction of the printing press obviously being an important factor here. Patten’s work could be described as an early example of the use of maps by a military historian, though in reality he was present as an official of the English government and so his published report is obviously subject to the bias implicit in his role.  There are no maps associated with the earlier accounts of the battle of Flodden (1513), which include: ‘The Trewe Encountre’ and the ‘Thordre and Behauyoure’ (both being news pamphlets published soon after the battle), and also the account by Robert Lyndsay of Pitscottie (1532-1580) in his ‘Historie and Chronicles of Scotland’ and Hall’s account of the battle in his contemporary account of the life of Henry VIII (reprinted 1904)‘Battle of Flodden’. Nor does a map or plan accompany the official account of the battle, the ‘Articles of the bataill’, which was composed on the battlefield on 10 September under the auspices of Thomas Howard, Lord Admiral of England (Parsons 2000). 
One of the main customers for battle maps is obviously the military establishment itself.  Military bureaucracy, which saw considerable expansion, in complexity if not efficiency, in the 18th century (Houlding 1981: 153), required that detailed records of every campaign and engagement were kept, and maps obviously played an important role here (O’Donoghue 1977).  They were not just used as historical records but also as teaching aids in the training of young officers.  It has long been a tradition within the British army for young officers to revisit the sites of battle for educational purposes, which in the 19th century were formalissed into ‘staff rides’ (Robertson 1987), and even today these may include battlefields of some antiquity, including Culloden and Waterloo (the author having led one of these military ‘guided tours’ at the former). During the 18th century it was the Board of Ordnance which took on the responsibility of ensuring these events were mapped.  The central role played by the Board is still remembered to this day through the Ordnance Survey, which was founded following the ground-breaking mapping of Scotland by General Roy and then a similar project in England and Wales, the former motivated by the recent ’45 rising and the latter at least in part by the perceived threat of French invasion. It should also be remembered that from the first part of the 18th century onwards, sketching and cartography would have been regarded as an important aspect of an army officer’s skill base, though more so among engineers than line officers – the school for military engineering and artillery opening at Woolwich in 1741, while the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, which trained line officers, was not founded until the British Army had performed so badly in the Netherlands in 1793-4 (Barnett 1969: 197).  This difference in skill is clearly reflected in the maps produced by engineers/artillery officers and line officers; e.g. Bastide’s maps of Glenshiel and Jones’ map of Culloden are more technically accomplished than Yorke’s maps of Culloden – below. 
All mapped out – Culloden 
The full flowering of Scottish battle maps came in 1746, with the Battle of Culloden, which saw the last gasp of Jacobite attempts to regain the crown for the Stuarts.  Fought on 16 April 1746 on a bleak stretch of moorland around twelve12 kilometres to the east of Inverness, the battle saw terrible losses inflicted on the Jacobite Army under Charles Edward Stuart at the hands of a stronger government army under the Duke of Cumberland.  The battle has gone down in both history and myth as the last battle fought on British soil and is widely regarded as the first nail in the coffin of the Highland way of life which was to culminate with the process of depopulation known as the Highland Clearances (Pollard 2009).     
It is perhaps not surprising that, given its relatively late position in the military history of Britain, Culloden is associated with a much greater wealth of documentary evidence than any of the battles which preceded it.  These include various writtwritten accounts by eye witnesses and a number of maps.  The site has also been subject to the most intensive programme of archaeological investigation yet to be carried out on a Scottish battlefield.  A key component of that investigation has been the examination of the contemporary battle maps.  An earlier examination of these sources (Aitcheson 1994) identified that more than 40 maps of the battle had been published by the end of 1746 (a useful list can also be found in Moir 1983, 145-148).  Many of these however seem to have their origins in no more than half a dozen maps which could reliably be said to have been drawn up by people who experienced the battle or its immediate aftermath - a forthcoming volume edited by the author (Pollard 2009) will publish most of these maps together for the first time, along with a consideration of them as a group by Robert Woosnam-Savage (2009).  
The majority of these maps were drawn by those on the government side, with the best known probably that by Thomas Sandby (Fig. 7), who served as a draughtsman and designer on Cumberland’s staff and was the elder brother of Paul Sandby who worked with William Roy on his mapping of Scotland (T Sandby also produced an interesting perspective drawing of the battle but this is not discussed further here).  This map displays the majority of features shared by most of the other examples.  It shows the position of the government and Jacobite armies as they faced one another across the moor.  The Jacobites were positioned between two stone enclosures, the right flank anchored on the Culwhiniac enclosure to the south and the left on Culloden Parks to the north.  The government army was positioned to the east with the left flank of the front line sitting in front of a small cluster of buildings known as Leanach and the right extending toward an area of marshy ground to the north. A smaller, horseshoe shaped, enclosure sits alongside the north eastern corner of the Culwhiniac enclosure, where it extends out onto the open moor, with the wide mouth opening to the east.  Most of the maps show, through a series of block formations and dotted lines, the movement of the Campbell militia and the mounted government dragoons through the gaps knocked through the walls of the Culwhiniac enclosure; and the passage of the dragoons to the rear right of the Jacobite lines and that of the Campbells to a position behind the northern wall of the enclosure, from where they were at liberty to shoot into the Jacobite right flank. 
Also shown on the map (Fig. 7) is the road which runs across the moor, passing under the left flank of the Jacobite line and crossing at a diagonal to left flank of the government line, where it passes close to the Leanach steading.  It is annotated as the ‘muir road to Inverness’.  As will become apparent, archaeological survey has suggested an important role for this feature in the battle.  What is not shown on the Sandby map is the Jacobite charge, which on the right managed to come to sword strokes with the government left but on the left became bogged down in wet ground some distance from the government right and centre. This movement is not however lacking on all of the maps, as demonstrated by that ofby John Finlayson, who also happened to be a Jacobite (he was a scientific instrument maker from Edinburgh). His map clearly shows the Jacobite right and centre veering toward the government left, where Barrell’s and Monro’s regiments were stationed.  
The attack is shown with less clarity on the map by Jasper Jones, who was an artillery officer on the government side.  This should perhaps not come as a surprise as being a gunner Jones was more concerned with the progress of the artillery barrage from both sides, with the cannons clearly marked and dotted lines showing the direction of fire. His map also shows the bringing forward of cannon and mortars to engage a single Jacobite gun concealed behind the walls of Culloden Parks, an event which took place in closing stages of the battle.  The Jones map also shows the road across the moor, albeit passing through the centre of the government line rather than its left flank.
One of the first objectives of the Culloden archaeological project was to subject the ground to survey and to relocate the features shown on the various maps, only then could the finer detail of the battle and its progress be understood.  Up until the 1980s much of the site was covered with forestry, first planted in the 19th century, which obviously placed restrictions on how the site could be displayed (parts of it had been in the ownership of the National Trust for Scotland (NTS) since the 1920s). Footpaths did however allow access to the battle lines and a map showing the various positions of the various units within the modern landscape was included in the NTS Culloden handbook, which was written by Iain Cameron Taylor and first published in 1965 – it was to go through several versions before being entirely overhauled for the opening of the new visitor centre in April 2008.  
The situation changed in the 1980s when the trees were removed by the NTS in order to provide a better impression of the open moor which existed at the time of the battle. At the same time, the tarmac road, which until then had run through the clan cemetery, was also relocated some 200 metres further to the north.  There had been calls for this move since at least the 19th century as its passage through the cemetery was seen as an act of desecration (people in carriages and then in cars drove through the cemetery to see grave mounds on either side of the road).  These actions allowed a more wholesale display of the battlefield – a custom- built visitor centre had existed on the site since 1970. Footpaths were laid out, taking visitors along the opposing battle lines, which were marked out with flags, and through the clan cemetery, which had been monumentalised in the 1880s through the placement of stone clan grave markers of each clan and the construction of a stone cairn dedicated the ‘Brave Highlanders’.  These markers were added to by display boards which indicated the position of the various regiments on both sides, in accordance with the guidebook map. 
Despite being demolished during 19th century agricultural improvements the eastern wall of the Culwhiniac enclosure is still visible as a wide course of foundation stones sitting beneath the modern fence line. This allowed the NTS to reconstruct the corner of the enclosure with reasonable accuracy.  Also reconstructed was the horseshoe- sshaped Leanach enclosure, as depictedalso shown on the maps.  This had not been built from stone but from turf and had long ago been ploughed out.  As it happened however the western line of the enclosure, where it sits closest to the Culwhiniac enclosure, had been preserved on modern Ordnance Survey maps as a parish boundary (Aitchison 1994).  The right flank of the Jacobite line, as marked by display panels, a row of flags and a footpath, was anchored close to eastern edge of the Culwhiniac enclosure, not far away from the western edge of the reconstructed turf enclosure.
As the survey progressed, however, it became apparent that the battlefield as displayed in the guidebook and indeed on the ground did not entirely correspond with reality. Metal detector survey in the so-called ‘Field of the English’, to the south of the battlefield core, as displayed by the NTS, revealed a dense scatter of battlefield debris, which included Jacobite and government musket balls (the former are slightly smaller than the latter), pistol balls, pieces of smashed musket, buttons and buckles.  This clearly related to the vicious hand to fight between elements of the Jacobite right and the two regiments on the government left (Barrell’s and Monro’s).  This location is a considerable distance from the position of these left flank regiments as marked by the NTS.  From this it is clear then that government line stretched much further to the south than was marked on the ground and on the guidebook map.  
The archaeological evidence placed Barrell’s regiment across the mouth of the enclosure, which seemed odd as most of the contemporary maps and certainly the history books imply that the Jacobites charged around the enclosure with Barrell’s regiment standing to the north of the entrance (i.e. leaving it open).  An intensive programme of metal detecting extending east to west, through the enclosure, revealed that musket balls and cannon shot (grape and canister) were scattered throughout the enclosure.  Given that there seemed little reason to believe that the reconstructed enclosure was in the wrong place this implied that the Jacobites did not charge around the outside of the feature but leapt over its western edge and charged through it, perhaps in the hope that it would provide some protection from incoming cannon and musket fire. However, as the first debris scatter suggests that Barrell’s regiment was in fact deployed across the mouth of the enclosure, albeit 200 yards further to the east,  it seems unlikely that much in the way of cover was provided.  Sandby’s map does show Barrell’s regiment positioned in accordance with these findings, and it is perhaps a shame that he has not attempted to show the route of the Jacobite charge.  
It is likely that the Leanach enclosure was a denuded relic by the time of the battle. For one thing the nearby stone enclosure is obviously a later feature as it kinks around the west side – though this respecting of the smaller structure perhaps suggests that it still served a purpose (possibly related to livestock herding).  Government eyewitness accounts of the battle, while not making any specific mention of the Jacobites charging through it, do suggest Jacobite cannon possibly dug in on their right flank and Lord Bury was sent forward to reconnoiter this position prior to the commencement of hostilities, which his advance may have precipitated (Boyse 1748: 148)  From a distance, eroded earth banks would look very much like hastily thrown up field fortifications and as such would have provided little obstacle to Jacobites eager to get to grips with the enemy.  
Another problem with the battlefield as displayed was that the battle lines were too close together.  This became most apparent when metal detector survey in the vicinity of the north eastern corner of the Culwhiniac enclosure, close to where the Jacobite right flank was marked, resulted in the recovery of a distinct scatter of musket balls, some of which were highly distorted through impact after being fired at close range.  These had clearly not been fired from the government line, which is more than 300 metres away to the north east.  The only documented event in the battle to which this material could relate is the fire-fight which erupted between the government Campbells, behind the stone wall, and the Royal Ecossois regiment (Scots in French service fighting for the Jacobites) who retreated from the battle front using the enclosure walls as cover.  Given that this fight occurred in the no man’s land between the two armies, or at least the government position and the former location of the Jacobite line - - which had by then charged forward - - its location in the modern landscape, on the Jacobite right, could mean only one thing: the location of the line was incorrectly marked in the NTS display. The origins of this mistake go back not only to the map in the guidebook but an earlier map from which it was taken.  This is not one of the few original maps but at least a second generation map which appeared in one of the relatively early books on the ‘45, written by John Home and published in 1802.  The map used to illustrate the battle, and evidently miscopied from earlier versions, has the Jacobite line in the same place as the NTS guidebook map and on the ground as presented prior to 2008. Another possible source is Tomasson’s and Buist’s ‘Battles of the ’45’, published in 1962, which would appear to have taken Home’s map as its source and therefore contains the same error.  One only has to refer to the original suite of maps to understand that the Jacobite line was anchored further to the west (the issue of re-adjustment of the line prior to charging as discussed by Reid 1994 is not considered here and in any case does not impact on the issue of the mistaken location). 
The foregoing has hopefully demonstrated how the use of original maps, in conjunction with archaeological survey has allowed for a more accurate understanding of the site and served to correct a number of errors in past interpretations.  Sandby’s map has played an important role in this process as it appears to be one of the most accurate – the fact that he has not attempted to portray the Jacobite charge may be a further indication of this as no one would have been in a position to witness this event clearly, a point to which this paper will return to presently. First though, it is worthwhile to note that it is not just the well presented and highly detailed maps drawn by experienced cartographers that can be of value.  
Among the least impressive looking of the original Culloden battle maps is the rough sketch drawn by Colonel Yorke (Fig. 8), who during the battle was ADC to Hawley and as such attached to the dragoons which moved through the enclosure to attack the Jacobites in the rear.  There are two variations of this map – the first was drawn in his orderly book and may be the earliest map of the battle (Woosnam-Savage 2009), while the other was sent in a letter dated 18 April to his father, the Lord Chancellor (it is the former which is reproduced here).  Despite its unpromising appearance – it looks like something hurriedly sketched on the back of a napkin over dinner – the map does show an interesting detail which is missing from all of the other contemporary maps, including Sandby’s.  A number of settlements are shown on the battle maps, including the Leanach steading, close to the government left and which has been subject to some degree of archaeological investigation (not discussed here), but Yorke’s map and a similarly sketchy example by the Jacobite Lord Elcho are the only ones to show a building inside the Culwhiniac enclosure.   
Yorke would certainly have been in a position to have observed the building, as he passed through the enclosure on horseback – a good example perhaps of how placement on the field can influence viewpoint, even in the preparation of maps (it is assumed that Yorke, Sandby and the others present during the battle had the leisure to study the ground after the battle as they were on the winning side).  
There is no obvious trace of this building present today, but a ruined structure is shown in roughly this location of the first edition Ordnance Survey map, published in the 1860s.  Walking the ground has however revealed some evidence for the structure. Situated on the edge of a field, which corresponds to the upper part of the Culwhiniac enclosure, is an area where stones cleared from the field have been dumped.  Within this rough ground it is possible to discern a line of stones, running roughly east to west, which clearly relate to a structure and very probably the building shown on Yorke’s map.  It is hoped that at some future date excavation will further enhance our understanding of this feature, the discovery of which has taken us a step further to reconstructing the landscape within which the battle was fought.
The stone wall which sits immediately adjacent to the area of stone field clearance, to the south, appears to be in the same location as that which separated the enclosure into northern and southern parts, and may include remnants of that original wall.  The location of the gate immediately to the north of this wall, on what would have been the eastern side of the stone enclosure (still marked by the remnant wall foundation previously mentioned) may coincide with the location of the breach knocked into this wall during the battle, and therefore provides the tantalising suggestion that the breach was never repaired and eventually became a formal gateway.  
The final issue to be discussed in relation to the maps and their use in archaeological research relates to the road which is so clearly shown crossing the battlefield on Sandby’s map, and also features on some of the others.  It seems highly likely that this feature was later subsumed beneath the tarmac road, which until the 1980s ran across the battlefield and passed through the clan cemetery.  This simple fact appears to have been overlooked by those who desired the movement of the road away from the cemetery.  The conflict over the road dates back to the 1830s when it underwent an upgrade, during which it was widened and surfaced.  Prior to then it would have been nothing more than a rough cart track and drove route.  This process has been generally regarded ever since as the construction of the road (e.g. Cameron Taylor, 1965,: 10), which is clearly not the case as the original is to be seen on Sandby’s map.  What the widening does appear to have done is disturb elements of the grave mounds located either side of it (it is here that the 1000 plus Jacobite dead were buried in long, communal grave pits).  There are accounts of bones being disturbed and later reinterred (Cameron Taylor, 1965, ibid.). 
It has been argued by the present author that the apparent construction of the road through the cemetery was not a deliberate act of desecration, although the disturbance of the graves was obviously insensitive; far from it, the grave pits were deliberately dug alongside the road in order to facilitate the delivery of bodies from various parts of the battlefield to the grave site by horse and cart (Pollard 2006a). Many of the bodies would have come from close by, as the cemetery is not far away from where the hand to hand fighting on the government left took place but some of them would have come from farther afield, having been killed in the earlier or later parts of the battle.  
The road did more than deliver bodies to the burial site, it also delivered part of the Jacobite charge to the government left.  This conclusion was one of the results of a close-grained contour survey of the battlefield core which took place as part of the archaeological project.  The old road, which was merely covered with topsoil when the new road was constructed further to the north, was found to follow the crest of a low ridge which runs across the battlefield.  One of the weaknesses of the contemporary battle maps is that they give very little idea of relief, and accordingly later accounts of the battle have tended to discuss the site as essentially level ground.  The truth is that ground over which the Jacobites charged does include hollows and rises, of which the ridge is the most obvious feature.  The term ‘obvious’ is perhaps a little misleading as even on the ground these features are not exactly striking, especially when the lie of the land is obscured beneath dense growths of trees or more recently the heather and gorse which colonised the ground following the removal of the trees in the 1980s.  On close inspection however there can be little doubt that the ridge along which the road travelled has the potential to influence the movement of troops across the ground, even more so when there is a road along which charging troops can cover ground faster than those running across rough moorland.
There has been some debate as to why the centre and right of the Jacobite charge veered to the right to engage with the government left while the Jacobite left failed to make much headway. These have included the unwillingness of the MacDonalds to advance on the left as they felt their place was on the right, and the delay in delivering the order to charge, which caused the centre and right to break away first (e.g. Reid 1994, 104). However, this choreography makes much more sense if the nature of the terrain is considered.  The road would encourage troops to run along it while the lee of the ridge, at least on its southern side may have provided cover from government fire for at least part of the way across the moor.  The very recent removal of trees from around the cemetery has highlighted the potential of this latter point.  The cemetery is situated in a distinct hollow into which the road would have dropped before carrying on to the settlement at Leanach.  The base of this hollow would have been out of sight of all government troops but those situated across it – probably the left flank of Monro’s regiment and the right flank of Barrell’s.  It is therefore no coincidence that it was this point of the government line which suffered the full force of the Jacobite charge.
In contrast, the ground across which the left flank had to charge was much more exposed to government fire, sloping gently down from the spine to the north.  It was also very wet, and still displays this characteristic today.  Add to this the longer distance over which the Jacobites had to charge, as the opposing lines were set against one another at an angle, and it is not at all surprising that the Jacobite left failed to come to hand strokes.  
The road and the topography which influenced its course has been almost entirely overlooked by historians studying the battle.  It has only been through close study of the maps and detailed survey of the ground itself that this breakthrough in interpretation has been possible.  The importance of the latter cannot be over-estimated as many of these maps show little in the way of terrain or relief. 
Conclusion
The two hundred years between the battles of Pinkie in 1547 and Culloden in 1746 saw a relatively slow progress in the nature of map making as it pertains to the depiction of battles.  As demonstrated by the maps of Scotland created by Timothy Pont in the late 1500s map making had reached a fairly advanced stage, with his creations sharing much in common with modern maps, being vertical, two dimensional representations of the landscape drawn to a specific scale, although he portrayed buildings and hills in three dimensions.  The perspective projection or plan remained popular with the creators of battle maps until the early 18th century, with Glenshiel from 1719, representing an important transition between the two forms.  The depiction of battles in paintings has much in common with the perspective plans and indeed in the case of Glenshiel again the plan appears to have informed the painting quite considerably.  
Both forms of battle map have the potential to provide important sources of information for the archaeologist seeking to locate sites of battle and to interpret the evidence contained within these landscapes of conflict.  The foregoing discussion has attempted to give some idea as to the types of information that these maps can provide but has also hopefully highlighted that, just like any other historical source, they are not infallible, and the failure of most of them to display details on relief has already been noted.  Space has prevented a consideration of the use of civilian maps in current battlefield research but their usefulness should not be discounted.  A good example is the 1766 division of commons map of the Sheriffmuir area which played an important role in precisely locating the 1715 battlefield (Pollard 2006b).
Although the majority of Scottish battles were not recorded cartographically it is hoped that our future understanding of them may benefit from the current use of the few battle maps we do have in helping to refine the archaeological techniques which have much potential to provide a fresh insight into these unique and precious landscapes. 
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Figure 1 Perspective plan or prospect of the Battle Pinkie (1547), perhaps a much later version based on the original Bodleian Library drawings (National Army Museum)

Figure 2 Tracing of Patten’s map of the Battle of Pinkie, first published in 1448 -battle at bottom of image 

Figure 3 Bastide’s plan of the Battle of Glenshiel (1719). View from south side of glen -Spanish positions to left of image (Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)

Figure 4 Bastide’s plan of the Battle of Glenshiel. Perspective from the east, looking up the glen toward Jacobite and Spanish positions (Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)

Figure 5 Detail of Bastide’s plan in Fig. 3 showing Major General Wightman to rear of mortar battery (Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)

Figure 6 Detail of Bastide’s plan in Fig. 3 showing Major General Wightman to right of mortar battery (Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)

Figure 7 Thomas Sandby’s 1746 map of the Battle of Culloden (The Royal Collection © 2009 Her Majesty the Queen)

Figure 8 Tracing of Yorke’s 1746 map of the Battle of Culloden, showing building in Culwhiniac enclosure – above the ‘5’ to left of image (original in the British Library)
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